نقش اثر حقیقت خیالی در باورپذیری خبرهای دروغین فضای مجازی

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه روان‌شناسی دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی بویین‌زهرا

چکیده

اثر حقیقت خیالی یعنی هنگامی که گزاره‌ای را پیش‌تر دیده‌ایم و با آن آشنا هستیم، آسان‌تر باور می‌کنیم؛ زیرا سیالی پردازش آن گزاره افزایش یافته است و این می‌تواند دلیل باورکردن خبرهای دروغین فضای مجازی باشد که معمولاً چند بار دیده می‌شود. در یک طرح آزمایشی و با هدف بررسی نقش اثر حقیقت خیالی در باورکردن خبرهای دروغین فضای مجازی، فراخوان شرکت در پژوهش به 50 هزار مشترک همراه اول و ایرانسل شهر تهران فرستاده شد و 1455 نفر (631 مرد) با میانگین سنی 27 سال در پژوهش شرکت کردند. ابزار پژوهش، 24 خبر دروغین بود. در مرحلة آشناسازی هشت خبر تازه، در مرحلة ارزیابی هشت خبر تازه و هشت خبر مرحلة آشناسازی و در مرحلة پیگیری هشت خبر تازه، هشت خبر مرحلة ارزیابی و هشت خبر مرحلة آشناسازی به آزمودنی‌ها نشان داده و از آن‌ها خواسته شد که صحت هر خبر را نمره‌گذاری کنند. تحلیل واریانس اندازه‌های تکراری نشان می‌دهد که حتی دربارة خبرهایی که آزمودنی‌ها هوشیارانه از آشنایی با آن‌ها آگاه نبودند، هر اندازه تعداد رویارویی پیشین (آشنایی) با خبرها بیشتر بود، راست‌پنداری خبرها نیز بیشتر بود؛ پس اثر حقیقت خیالی می‌تواند یکی از دلایل باورکردن خبرهای دروغین باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Role of Illusory Truth Effect in Believing the False News of Cyberspace

نویسنده [English]

  • Ebrahim Ahmadi
Assistant Professor, Department of Psychology, Buin Zahra Branch, Islamic Azad University, Buin Zahra, Iran
چکیده [English]

Introduction: Why do so many people believe fake cyberspace news? What are the mechanisms underlying these misconceptions? Current research tests a possible answer to this question: previous encounters (being familiar) with false news. Because news are so easily spread in cyberspace, people see news in different contexts of cyberspace (such as Instagram, Telegram, Twitter, Facebook, etc.), and this means that they see one news more than once.
Method: The study included 1,455 participants with that the mean and standard deviation of their age was 27.10 and 3.88, respectively, with a range of 18 to 39 years, and 631 of whom were male. The instrument of this study were 24 false news headlines. With a dependent true experimental design (or repeated measures), the participants were tested in a four-step experiment: In the familiarizing phase, eight false news headlines were shown to the subjects and they were asked if they wanted to share the news with other; In the assessment phase, sixteen false news headlines were shown to the subjects, that eight of them had been seen in the familiarizing phase and eight headlines were new, and the subjects were asked to rate the familiarity and accuracy of each news; In the follow-up phase, twenty-four false news headlines were shown to the subjects, that eight of them had been seen in familiarizing phase and in assessment phase (i.e., twice), eight of them had been seen only in the evaluation phase (i.e., once), and eight headlines were new, and subjects were asked to rate the familiarity and accuracy of each news.
Findings: Repeated measures ANOVA showed that the confrontation effect was significant, i.e., the familiarized news were rated more accurate than the non-familiarized news. Additionally, in the follow-up phase, repeated measures ANOVA showed that the effect of the confrontation was significant, so that were rated more familiar than once familiarized news and non-familiarized news.
Results & Conclusion: The current study showed that the familiarized news were more believable than the new news. The impact of confrontation on believing the news not only lasted for ten days, but also increased with the second confrontation. The mechanism of illusory truth effect is that human beings seek the easiest way to judge the rightness /wrongness of propositions, and one of these easy ways is the processing fluency, i.e., the human beings easily believe whatever they easily understand, and being familiar with propositions helps to easily understand them.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • False news
  • illusory truth effect
  • cyberspace
  • Processing fluency
  • familiarity
  • believability
  • نعمتی‌نیا، لیلا، معدنی، سعید و محبوبه بابائی (1399)، «پنداشت ذهنی شهروندان تهرانی از احساس ناامنی در فضاهای بی‌دفاع شهری»، مطالعات و تحقیقات اجتماعی در ایران، شمارة 1: 129-130.
  • کریمی، علیرضا، بابائی، محمد و پروانه احمدی‌راد (1399)، «نگرش سیاسی دانشجویان کنشگر و عوامل اجتماعی مؤثر بر آن (مورد مطالعه: دانشجویان دانشگاه‌های شهر تهران)»، مطالعات و تحقیقات اجتماعی در ایران، شمارة 1: 235-262.‌
 
Allcott, H., and Gentzkow, M. (2017), “Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election (NBER Working Paper No. 23098)”, Retrieved From http:// www.nber.org/papers/w23089.
Alter, A. L., and Oppenheimer, D. M. (2009), “Uniting the Tribes of Fluency to Form a Metacognitive Nation”, Personality and Social Psychology Review, No. 13: 219 –235, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868309341564.
Beck, J. (2017), “This Article Won’t Change Your Mind: the Fact on Why Facts Alone Can’t Fight False Beliefs”, Atlantic, retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/this-article-wont-change-your-mind/519093.
Begg, I. M., Anas, A., and Farinacci, S. (1992), “Dissociation of Processes in Belief: Source Recollection, Statement Familiarity, and the Illusion of Truth”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, No. 121: 446 – 458. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0096-3445.121.4.446.
Berinsky, A. A. J. (2017), “Rumors andHealth Care Reform: Experiments in Political Misinformation”, British Journal of Political Science, 47: 241–262, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123415000186.
Calvert, D. (2017), The Psychology Behind Fake News: Cognitive Biases Help Explain Our Polarized Media Climate, retrieved from https:// insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/the-psychology-behind-fake- news.
Corlett, P. R., Krystal, J. H., Taylor, J. R., and Fletcher, P. C. (2009), “Why Do Delusions Persist?”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, No. 3: 12, http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/neuro.09.012.2009.
Dechêne, A., Stahl, C., Hansen, J., and Wänke, M. (2010), “The Truth About the Truth: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Truth Effect”, Personality and Social Psychology Review, No. 14: 238 –257, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868309352251.
Diana, R., Yonelinas, A., and Ranganath, C. (2007), “Imaging Recollection and Familiarity in the Medial Temporal Lobe: A Three-Component Model”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, No. 11: 379 –386, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.08.001.
Fazio, L. K., Brashier, N. M., Payne, B. K., and Marsh, E. J. (2015), “Knowledge Does Not Protect Against Illusory Truth”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, No. 144: 993–1002, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/ xge0000098.
Flynn, D., Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. (2017), “The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics”, Advances in Political Psychology, No. 38(S1): 127–150, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12394.
Gabielkov, M., Ramachandran, A., Chaintreau, A., and Legout, A. (2016), “Social Clicks: What and Who Gets Read on Twitter?”, retrieved from http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2901462.
Goldman, R. (2016), “Reading Fake News, Pakistani Minister Directs Nuclear Threat at Israel”, The New York Times, retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/24/world/asia/pakistan-israel- khawaja-asif-fake-news-nuclear.html.
Gottfried, J., and Shearer, E. (2016), “News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016”, retrieved from http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use- across-social-media-platforms-2016.
Johar, G., and Roggeveen, A. (2007), “Changing False Beliefs From Repeated Advertising: the Role of Claim-Refutation Alignment”, Journal of Consumer Psychology, No. 17: 118 –127, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1057-7408(07)70018-9.
Kahan, D. M. (2013), “Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection”, Judgment and Decision Making, No. 8: 407– 424.
Kahan, D. M. (2017), “Misconceptions, Misinformation, and the Logic of Identity-Protective Cognition”, Cultural Cognition Project Working Paper Series, No. 164: Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 605; Yale Law and Economics Research Paper No. 575, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973067.
Kahan, D. M., Peters, E., Wittlin, M., Slovic, P., Ouellette, L. L., Braman, D., and Mandel, G. (2012), “The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks”, Nature Climate Change, No. 2: 732–735, http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nclimate1547.
Lazer, D. M. J., Baum, M. A., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A. J., Greenhill, K. M., Menczer, F.,... Zittrain, J. L. (2018), “The Science of Fake News”, Science, No. 359: 1094 –1096, http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.aao2998.
Mercier, H., and Sperber, D. (2011), “Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, No. 34: 57–74, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x10000968.
Pennycook, G., Cannon, T. D., and Rand, D. G. (2018), “Prior Exposure Increases Perceived Accuracy of Fake News”, Journal of Experimental Psychology,No 12: 1865-1880.
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., and Koehler, D. J. (2015), “What Makes Us Think? A Three-Stage Dual-Process Model of Analytic Engagement”, Cognitive Psychology, No. 80: 34 –72, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001.
Pennycook, G., and Rand, D. (2017), “The Implied Truth Effect: Attaching Warnings to a Subset of Fake News Stories Increases Perceived Accuracy of Stories Without Warnings”, retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3035384.
Pennycook, G., and Rand, D. G. (2018a), “Lazy, Not Biased: Susceptibility to Partisan Fake News Is Better Explained by Lack of Reasoning Than by Motivated Reasoning”, Cognition, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2018.06.011.
Pennycook, G., and Rand, D. G. (2018b), “Who Falls for Fake News? the Roles of Bullshit Receptivity, Overclaiming, Familiarity, and Analytic Thinking”, retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=3023545.
Polage, D. C. (2012), “Making Up History: False Memories of Fake News Stories”, Europe’s Journal of Psychology, No. 8: 245–250, http://dx.doi.org/ 10.5964/ejop.v8i2.456.
Redlawsk, D. (2002), “Hot Cognition or Cool Consideration? Testing the Effects of Motivated Reasoning on Political Decision Making”, Journal of Politics, No. 64: 1021–1044, http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2508.00161.
Sanford, N., Veckenstedt, R., Moritz, S., Balzan, R. P., and Woodward, T. S. (2014), “Impaired Integration of Disambiguating Evidence in Delusional Schizophrenia Patients”, Psychological Medicine, No. 44: 2729 –2738, http:// dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0033291714000397.
Schwartz, M. (1982), “Repetition and Rated Truth Value of Statements”, AmericanJournal of Psychology, No. 95: 393– 407, http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1422132.
Schwarz, N., Sanna, L. L. J., Skurnik, I., and Yoon, C. (2007), “Metacognitive Experiences and the Intricacies of Setting People Straight: Implications For Debiasing and Public Information Campaigns”, Advances in ExperimentalSocialPsychology, No. 39: 127–161, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0065- 2601(06)39003-x.
Shane, S. (2017), “From Headline to Photograph, A Fake News Masterpiece”, New York Times, retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/fake-news-hillary-clinton-cameron-harris.html.
Silverman, C., Strapagiel, L., Shaban, H., and Hall, E. (2016), “Hyperpartisan Facebook Pages Are Publishing False and Misleading in- Formation at An Alarming Rate”, Buzzfeed News, retrieved from https:// www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/partisan-fb-pages-analysis.
Singal, J. (2017), “This is a Great Psychological Framework for Understanding How Fake News Spreads”, New York Magazine, Retrieved From, http://nymag.com/scienceofus/2017/01/a-great-psychological-framework-for-understanding-fake-news.html.
Swire, B., Berinsky, A. J., Lewandowsky, S., and Ecker, U. K. H. (2017), “Processing Political Misinformation: Comprehending the Trump Phenomenon”, Royal Society Open Science, No. 4: 160802, http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160802.
Unkelbach, C. (2007), “Reversing the Truth Effect: Learning the Interpretation of Processing Fluency in Judgments of Truth”, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, No. 33: 219 –230, http:// dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.33.1.219.
Unkelbach, C., and Rom, S. (2017), “A Referential Theory of the Repetition- Induced Truth Effect”, Cognition, 160: 110 –126, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.12.016.