Introduction

Corruption is widely regarded as one of the most significant obstacles to effective governance and sustainable development. It weakens public institutions, undermines political legitimacy, distorts economic decision-making, and erodes public trust. In Iran, corruption has long been a major political and social concern. Although combating corruption and promoting social justice were among the central objectives of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, corruption has remained a persistent challenge and manifested in numerous large-scale financial and administrative scandals over recent decades.

International assessments consistently rank Iran among the countries with relatively high levels of perceived corruption. However, a comparative examination of the Middle Eastern countries reveals an important puzzle. Several countries in the region share characteristics commonly associated with corruption, including authoritarian political systems, dependence on natural-resource revenues, and limited democratic accountability. Despite these similarities, corruption levels differ considerably. While Iran and Turkey exhibit relatively high levels of corruption, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan perform comparatively better on international corruption-control indicators.

This study seeks to explain this variation by addressing the following question: Despite their common regional and structural features, why do Iran and Turkey exhibit substantially higher levels of corruption compare to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan? Rather than merely identifying factors associated with corruption, the research aims to determine which factors most effectively distinguish high-corruption cases from lower-corruption cases.

Method

The study employs a historical-comparative research design and uses John Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference as its principal analytical framework. Five countries—Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan—were selected because they share historical, cultural, and geopolitical similarities while exhibiting meaningful variation in corruption levels.

Corruption is defined as the abuse of public authority for private gain and measured through internationally recognized indicators, particularly Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Bank’s Control of Corruption indicator. Drawing on the theoretical literature, eight explanatory variables were examined and grouped into three broad categories: 1) Institutional and governance factors, including institutional quality, the rule of law, and government accountability and transparency; 2) Political-economy factors, including natural-resource rents, political power concentration, and state intervention in the economy; 3) Socio-cultural factors, including social capital and political culture.

Data were collected from reputable international sources such as the World Bank, Transparency International, Freedom House, the World Values Survey, Arab Barometer, and other governance databases. Through systematic comparison, the study identifies which factors consistently differentiate countries with high levels of corruption from those with lower levels.

Findings

The comparative analysis demonstrates that many commonly cited causes of corruption fail to explain the observed differences among the selected countries. Factors such as dependence on oil revenues, political authority concentration, restricted democratic participation, and weak social capital are present to varying degrees across both high-corruption and lower-corruption cases.

For example, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are highly dependent on natural-resource rents and possess centralized political structures, yet they exhibit lower levels of corruption than Iran and Turkey. Similarly, restrictions on political competition and accountability are evident across most of the countries examined, regardless of their corruption rankings. These findings indicate that such variables, although potentially contributing to corruption, do not adequately account for cross-national variation.

Among the eight variables analyzed, institutional quality emerges as the only factor that consistently conforms to the logic of Mill’s Method of Difference. Iran and Turkey, as countries with elevated corruption levels, display relatively weak, fragmented, and less effective institutions. In contrast, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan possess governance institutions that are comparatively more coherent, capable, and effective in implementing regulations and overseeing public administration.

In Iran, institutional fragmentation, overlapping responsibilities among oversight agencies, limited judicial independence, and the influence of powerful informal networks have contributed to the persistence and reproduction of corruption. Although anti-corruption organizations formally exist, their effectiveness is often reduced by legal ambiguities, insufficient coordination, and political constraints.

Turkey presents a similar pattern. Institutional reforms implemented during the early 2000s initially strengthened governance capacity and accountability mechanisms. However, subsequent political developments, particularly the increasing concentration of executive power and weakening of judicial and media independence, reduced the effectiveness of institutional checks and increased vulnerability to corruption.

By contrast, Saudi Arabia has developed a relatively centralized but effective administrative apparatus capable of enforcing compliance and controlling various forms of corruption despite imperfect democratic accountability. Kuwait and Jordan have also benefited from comparatively stronger administrative systems, procedural oversight mechanisms, and gradual institutional reforms that have enhanced governance capacity.

The findings further suggest that strong institutions can reduce the corrupting effects of other adverse conditions, including rentier economic structures and concentrated political authority. Conversely, weak institutions magnify the corruption risks associated with these factors.

Conclusion

This study concludes that although corruption is a multidimensional phenomenon influenced by numerous political, economic, and social factors, these factors do not possess equal explanatory weight. Through a historical-comparative analysis of five Middle Eastern countries, the research identifies institutional quality as the principal factor explaining differences in corruption levels.

The results indicate that effective institutions—particularly those associated with the rule of law, bureaucratic capacity, regulatory coherence, and oversight—constitute a necessary condition for controlling corruption. Even in contexts characterized by authoritarian governance or heavy dependence on natural-resource revenues, strong institutions can significantly limit opportunities for corruption.

The policy implications are particularly relevant for Iran and Turkey. Sustainable reductions in corruption require comprehensive institutional reforms aimed at strengthening judicial independence, improving coordination among oversight bodies, enhancing administrative effectiveness, and expanding transparency and accountability mechanisms. Without such reforms, anti-corruption initiatives are unlikely to achieve lasting success.

By highlighting institutional quality as the key explanatory variable, this study contributes to the comparative literature on corruption in the Middle East and provides an empirically grounded framework for understanding why corruption varies across countries that otherwise share many structural and historical characteristics.